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STATUTES AND COURT RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 2/6 
1 
SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENT 
There is no inconsistency between decisions of this court 
which have applied the doctrine of equitable conversion and the 
result urged by petitioners in this case. The fact that this 
court has applied the doctrine of equitable conversion in earlier 
cases does not mandate a holding that equitable conversion is a 
rule of universal application whenever the property interests of 
a seller and buyer of real property on contract are considered. 
Nor is it illogical to conclude that the contract seller and the 
contract buyer might both have an ownership interest in the real 
property sold on contract/ either of which interest might become 
subject to the lien of a judgment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-22-1. The courts of other states have held that two lienable 
interests exist when real property has been sold on contract 
prior to the entry or docketing of a judgment when the contract 
is still executory in part. 
If the seller's interest in the real property sold on 
contract is measured by the amount still owing on the contract at 
the time the buyer acquires actual notice of a docketed judgment 
against the seller/ there is no undue burden to the buyer in 
requiring him from that time forward to honor the lien and make 
payments as they become due to the judgment creditor. In fact/ 
in this case the Clements assert that the lien of their judgment 
against the Barkers bound the Lockhart Road property only in the 
amount that was still unpaid on the uniform real estate contract 
between the judgment debtors/ the Barkers/ and the purchaser/ 
2 
Diane Hodge, at the time the Cannefaxes agent acquired notice of 
the judgment. 
The Cannefaxes argument that the title company that 
discovered the existence of the judgment was not their agent (or 
that evidence of agency is lacking) was not raised in the trial 
court and should not be considered for the first time now. 
Nevertheless, the stipulated facts implicitly establish that the 
title company was the Cannefaxes1 agent. If this court does hold 
that the issu§ of the title company's agency is determinative and 
unresolved by the stipulated facts, and that the Cannefaxes were 
not required to first raise the issue in opposition to the 
Clements summary judgment motion, then rather than affirm the 
ruling and order of the Court of.Appeals, the appropriate action 
would be to remand to the trial court for findings as to whether 
or not Surety Title was acting as the Cannefaxes1 agent when it 




WHEN PROPERTY IS SOLD ON CONTRACT, WHICH CONTRACT 
IS EXECUTORY, THERE IS NO INCONSISTANCY WITH 
PRIOR UTAH LAW IN FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF 
TWO SEPARATE PROPERTY INTERESTS, EITHER 
OF WHICH MIGHT BECOME SUBJECT TO A 
JUDGMENT LIEN 
In Point I of Respondents1 Brief, the Cannefaxes argue tnat 
in view of this courtfs consistent application to date of the 
doctrine of equitable conversion it would be inconsistent to not 
apply the doctrine in this case. Of course, in each of the 
previous Utah cases relied upon by respondents, Allred v. Allred, 
15 Utah 2d 396, 393 P.2d 791 (1964), In re Estate of Willson, 28 
Utah 2d 197, 499 P.2d 1298 (1972), and Jelco, Inc. v. Third 
Judicial Dist. Court, 29 Utah 2d 472, 511 P.2d 739 (1973), the 
court was analyzing the interests of a contract seller vis-a-vis 
a contract buyer, and not vis-a-vis a third-party. This court 
has not yet held, as respondents ujge that it now do, that the 
doctrine of equitable coiwarsion is a rule of universal 
application to be applied in all cases, regardless of the facts 
or equities involved. Because this case involves a third-parties 
—the judgment creditors of the contract seller—it is 
appropriate for this court to take a fresh look at the issue of 
whether the doctrine of equitable conversion need be applied at 
all in the context of the Utah judgment lien statute, and if so 
whether equitable conversion is a rule of law or an equitable 
principle to be applied only when application is equitable. 
Respondents also argue it would be inconsistent to now hold 
that a seller's interest is also real property, having previously 
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held in Butler v. Wilkinson/ 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987), and Bill 
Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley Const. Co./ 677 P.2d 1120 (Utah 
1984)/ that the buyer's interest is real property. Respondent's 
state: "Logically/ both the buyer and the seller cannot own the 
property and if this court has already determined that the buyer 
does/ the seller cannot . . .." (Respondents' Brief, p. 16). 
The logic of respondents' position and the illogic of 
petitioners' position is not explained. One can think of 
numerous circumstances involving two persons/ each of whom has an 
interest in property; e.g. a lessor and lessee/ or a fee owner or 
holder of a life estate and the holder of a reversionary 
interest. There is nothing illogical about finding that where 
real property has been sold on contract there are two distinct 
ownership interests to which a judgment lien might attach/ the 
equitable interest of the contract purchaser/ as measured by his 
equity in the proparty/ and the legal interest of the contract 
seller/ as measured by the amount still owed to the seller on the 
property at either the time the judgment against the seller is 
properly docketec DC at the time the buyer gains actual notice of 
the docketed judgaiant. The courts of several jurisdictions have 
recognized that both the contract seller and contract purchaser 
have an ownership interest in the real property being purchased/ 
either one of which interests might become subject to a judgment 
lien. Compare/ e.g./ Cascade Sec. Bank v. Butler; 567 P.2d 631 
(Wash. 1977), with Heath v. Dodson, 110 P.2d 845 (Wash. 1941); 
Fulton v. Duro/ 700 P.2d 13 (Idaho 1985), with First Security 
Bank v. Rogers/ 429 P.2d 386 (Idaho 1967); and Fridley v. Munson, 
194 N.W. 1840 (S.D. 1923)/ with Yarnall v. First Nat. Bank of 
Stillwater/ 74 B.R. 3 (D.S.D. 1986) [applying South Dakota law]. 
Respondents have stated no reason why ownership of real 
property under Utah's judgment lien statute/ Utah Code Ann. § 78-
22-1/ cannot include the contract seller's legal interest as well 
as the contract purchaser's equitable interest. If this court 
were to so hold/ it could entirely avoid application of the 
equitable doctrine doctrine to a straight forward/ broadly worded 
statute. 
B. 
IF THE CONTRACT SELLER'S INTEREST IS MEASURED BY THE 
AMOUNT UNPAID AT THE TIME THE BUYER GAINS ACTUAL 
NOTICE OF THE JUDGMENT AGAINST THE SELLER, THE 
BURDEN ON THE BUYER WILL BE MINIMAL 
In Point III.B. of Respondents' Brief/ they argue that at 
least a judgment lien should not attach to the contract seller's 
retained legal interest on the property sold on contract until 
the buyer has actual notice of the docketed judgment. 
The Clements do not insist on a rule that would require a 
buyer to search the judgment index before every installment 
payment on a contract to purchase real property is made/ lest the 
buyer end up paying twice. A contract buyer should be entitled 
to the benefit of all payments made to the seller. In this case/ 
the Clements have asked nothing more than that the lien of their 
judgment against the Barkers attach to the extent the contract 
between the Barkers and their purchaser was unpaid at the time a 
6 
title search conducted on the Cannefaxes behalf revealed the 
existence of the judgment. 
The Clements1 judgment was docketed in Salt Lake County on 
August 19, 1985. On September 25, 1985 funds to pay off the 
contract between the judgment debtors and their purchaser, Hodge, 
were escrowed. On September 26/ 1985, prior to recording of 
deeds (and presumably prior to disbursement of the escrowed 
funds), a title search disclosed the existence of the judgment. 
As of September 26, 1985, after paying off the encumbrances on 
the Lockhart Road property, there was $54,464.94 payable to the 
Barkers. That is the amount of the Barkers1 interest in the 
Lockhart Road property to which the lien of the Clements1 
judgment attached. The Clements have never even inquired as to 
whether Diane Hodge made any other payments oat^een August 19 and 
September 26, 1985. 
If the amount of a judgment lien against a contract seller's 
interest is measured by the amount due to the seller as of the 
date the buyer gains actual notice of the docketed judgment, then 
the inconvenience to the buyer of either (1) making payments from 
that time forward to the seller's judgment creditor or (2) out of 
an abundance of caution, interpleading payments as they came due, 
would be minimal. 
This case, of course, involves only a final lump sum payment 
made to the Barkers at a time when a title search had disclosed 
1. See part C. of this Argument. 
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the existence of the Clements1 judgment. There is no evidence in 
this case that either Diane Hodge or the Cannefaxes would have 
incurred any burden had they insisted that the funds already 
escrowed either be paid toward the judgment or that the 
encumbrance created by the judgment otherwise be cleared before 
the funds could be disbursed to the Barkers. 
C. 
THE CANNEFAXES HAVE NEVER BEFORE—NEITHER IN THE TRIAL 
COURT NOR AT THE COURT OF APPEALS—ARGUED THAT THE 
TITLE COMPANY HANDLING THE TWO-WAY CLOSING WAS 
NOT THEIR AGENT FOR PURPOSES OF GAINING ACTUAL 
NOTICE OF THE CLEMENTS1 JUDGMENT 
The Cannefaxes1 sole position in both the trial court and at 
the Court of Appeal tfas that equitable conversion applied to 
convert the judgment debtors1 interast in the Lockhart Road 
property to personalty/ so the judgment debtors had no real 
property upon which a judgment lien could attach. The general 
rule is well established that an issue not raised in the trial 
court will not be considered for the first time on appeal. 
Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040 
(Utah 1983); Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1322-23 (Utah 
1982); Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1359 
(Utah App. 1990). 
In Point IV of their brief, the Cannefaxes1 argue for the 
first time that the actual notice of the Clements1 judgment 
obtained when Surety Title Agency conducted a title search 
between closing on September 25, 1985 and recording on September 
26, 1985 was not actual notice to them, because there is no 
evidence that Surety was their agent. The Clements respectfully 
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submit that there is no reason to depart from the general rule in 
this case and that the "agency" argument should not be 
considered. 
However, even if the court were to consider this new 
argument, the Stipulated Facts upon which this case was decided 
in the trial court are sufficient to support the finding that 
Surety Title Agency was the Cannefaxes1 agent. Stipulated Fact 
No. 14 (R. 108) states: A title search conducted by the settle-
ment agent, Surety Title Agency, between closing on September 25, 
1985 and recording on September 26, 1985 disclosed [Clements1] 
judgment against the Barkers." Since it is clear from Stipulated 
Fact No. 14 that Surety Title Agency was someone's agent, the 
question is narrowed to a d^tariainaLiod as to who was the 
principal. The Clements submit that unless Surety Title was the 
agent for the buyers at the two-way closing, there was no reason 
to conduct a title search between closing and recording. It was 
ultimately the Cannefaxes who were interested in obtaining a 
clear title, free from encumbrances. This case was decided on 
the Clements summary judgment motion; not on cross-motions for 
summary judgment. The Cannefaxes never asserted that a triable 
issue existed as to whether they had actual notice of the 
Clements1 judgment or that Surety Title Agency was not their 
agent, nor did they assert that it would be a defense to the 
attachment of a judgment lien if they did not have actual notice 
of the judgment. 
Finally, if this court were to conclude that the issue of 
whether the Cannefaxes had actual notice of the Clements1 
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judgment either personally or through an agent is determinative 
but unresolved/ the proper resolution of the appeal would not be 
to affirm the order of the Court of Appeals/ but instead would be 
to remand the case to the trial court. Since this case was 
resolved in the trial court on the Clements' summary judgment 
motion/ if the existence of an agency relationship between the 
Cannefaxes and Surety Title is not implicit in the Stipulated 
Facts and in Cannefaxes1 failure to raise the issue in the trial 
court/ then the case must be remanded to the trial court so that 
it may make a factual determination as to for whom Surety Title 
was acting as settlement agent. 
Certainly the Clements had the burden in the trial court of 
negating the existence of triable issues of material fact before 
becoming entitled to summary judgment/ but as stated by Judge 
Bullock in his dissenting opinion below; "[s]ince the Cannefaxes 
had the burden of avoiding the lien in order to quiet title/ 
judgment against them is correct/ even though there was no 
apparant inquiry into either actual notice/ the Cannefaxes1 
knowledge jaf the judgment or lack of it/ or into their bona fides 
in any respect. [11] The Cannefaxes/ in seeking to quiet title 
against the Clements/ had the burden of going forward with 
evidence showing that the lien was unenforceable." Cannefax v. 
Clement/ 786 P.2d 1377, 1390-91 (Utah App. 1990) (J. Bullock 
dissenting) (footnotes omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the stipulated facts, the arguments set forth in 
Petitioners1 Brief/ and the arguments raised in the dissenting 
opinion of Judge Bullock in the Court of Appeals/ petitioners 
Donald and Ruth Clement respectfully submit that the decision of 
the Utah Court of Appeals should be overruled and the summary 
judgment entered in their favor by the trial court should be 
reinstated. 
Alternatively/ if this court finds that the issue of actual 
notice by the Cannefaxes of the Clements1 judgment is crucial and 
unresolved by the stipulated facts/ then the case should be 
remanded to the Third District Court for a factual determination 
as to whether Surety Title Agency was acting as agent for the 
Cannefaxes or whetnjc the/ had personal knowledge of the judgment 
prior to disbursement of Diane Hodge's final payment on the 
contract. 
Dated this ^ S _ day of September, 1990. 
By > ^ > / 7 ^ 
Steven H. Lybbert 
Attorney for Petitioners 
Donald W. Clement and Ruth 
Clement 
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